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Abstract  
Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 2005-2013, we investigate the independent relationships of Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) IT expertise, Chief Financial Officer (CFO) IT expertise, and board level 
technology committees with data security breaches. Overall, our results indicate that firms that either 
employ a CEO with IT expertise or implement a technology committee are more likely to detect and report 
breaches. Further, firms that employ a CFO with IT expertise are less likely to report a breach, suggesting 
that these firms are better at preventing breaches. The aggregate findings build on the extant corporate 
governance and risk management literatures.  
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Introduction 
According to a recent Ponemon Institute (2015) study, US firms report the highest average cost per breach 
at $15 million. Further, cyberattacks are costlier the longer they are not detected and accounted for. 
Ponemon reports an average of 46 days at a cost of $21,155 per day to resolve a detected cyberattack. 
From a regulatory perspective, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has felt the need to build 
on its initial 2011 cybersecurity disclosure guidance by providing an increasing number of comment 
letters to firms. In multiple instances, the SEC has identified inadequate firm disclosure of data security 
breach risk and required improved risk disclosure in the following Form 10-K or 10-Q (Rood 2015). Thus, 
there is a need to change the traditional corporate governance structures to better address the risks and 
costs associated with data security breaches. The key ideas are that 1) senior management should possess 
the necessary technical skills to work with the board of directors (henceforth, the “board”) to address the 
risks of data security breaches and 2) a separate board-level technology committee should be established 
to handle cybersecurity and other information technology (IT) risks. Consequently, the purpose of this 
study is to investigate the roles that the following three governance actors play in preventing and 
detecting data security breaches: Chief Executive Officers (CEO) possessing IT expertise; Chief Financial 
Officers (CFO) possessing IT expertise; and board-level technology committees. 
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Our study’s purpose focuses on the IT governance (ITG) component of the larger corporate governance 
construct.1 The principles, policies, and frameworks model set forth by COBIT 5 (ISACA 2013) identifies 
the board, the CEO, and CFO as necessary elements to define governance objectives and enterprise values. 
More specific to a cybersecurity context, the following opening statement from a recent National 
Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) meeting supports the importance of the board and 
management representing key governance actors needing to effectively communicate with each other, 
“proper preparation for a security breach begins with board and management discussing how they will 
handle a breach.” (NACD, 2014, 4). Whereas the extant literature has examined our context of data 
security breaches in general (e.g., Gwebu et al. 2013), technology committees and breaches (Higgs et al. 
2016), and CEO IT expertise in a financial reporting context (e.g., Haislip et al. 2016a), no study that has 
come to our attention considers the importance and role of all three governance actors in firms’ 
cybersecurity strategies.  
 
Using a propensity score matched approach, our sample consists of 265 treatment (breach) firms and 265 
control (non-breach) firms from 2005-2014. Firms with reporting data security breach(es) have ITG 
governance actors with weaker IT expertise.  Consistent with our expectations, results indicate that both a 
CEO with IT expertise and a separate, board-level technology committee are positively associated with 
reporting a breach, while CFOs with IT expertise are negatively associated with reported breaches. The 
negative association for CFOs suggests that those with IT expertise are more adept at putting effective 
internal control policies and procedures into place to prevent breaches from occurring.  
 
In aggregate, our study makes multiple contributions to the governance and risk management literatures. 
First, we document the complementary roles IT expertise has at the CEO and board levels when detecting 
and reporting security breaches. Prior related research investigates potential CEO expertise associations 
with annual disclosure quality and finds evidence suggesting IT expertise provides a benefit financial 
expertise does not. Second, our related findings should be of interest to academics interested in the 
associations between board dynamics and risk factors in general and, more specifically, board-level 
solutions to security breaches. Finally, our findings add to the budding CFO expertise literature. Little is 
known about the CFO’s roles within the firm outside of various financial reporting aspects identified in 
the respective Finance and Financial Accounting literatures. Despite a plethora of arguments from 
industry suggesting positive effects of tech savvy CFOs reducing IT risk in general (data security breaches 
more specifically), and Sambamurthy and Zmud’s (2012) conceptual linkage of CFOs to demand-side IT 
risk management activities in general, no academic research came to our attention empirically linking 
these two concepts. Further, by investigating CEOs and CFOs separately, we avoid the limitation in prior 
top executive research that combines the two as “senior management” results (e.g., Li et al. 2007; Hsu and 
Wang 2015). 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
A strong IT tone at the top is a common thread between the relevant ITG and IT risk management 
literatures. Sambamurthy and Zmud’s (2012) seminal work is a comprehensive description of IT risk, IT 
risk management, and ITG. According to the authors, regardless of how judiciously a firm moves forward 
with its security policies and procedures, it remains exposed to many IT risks (p. 2). Further, firms are 
digitally-exposed once their security barriers have been breached with intruders using new tactics that are 
increasingly difficult to prevent or detect. Although the TMT literature has long recognized that strong 
leadership is a foundational block found in top IT risk management firms, it was not until the recent large 
number of high-profile security breaches that has made absence of such leadership at the top 
conspicuously evident (Roboff 2016). 
 
CEOs oversee firm-wide IT policies and strategies to set the strategic IT tone at the top that include such 
decisions as how risk of security breaches should be assessed, monitored, and mitigated. Masli et al. 
(2016) contend that CEOs are treated differently by the board than CFOs at least partly due to their 
                                                             
1 ITG is defined by Debreceny (2013, 129) as “the process by which organizations seek to ensure that their investment 
in information technology facilitates strategic and tactical goals.” According to Higgs et al. (2016), it represents an 
increasingly important subset of the broader corporate governance environment. 
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fiduciary duties. Specifically, the authors claim the CEO’s duty is of a general nature to ensure the 
strategic IT flexibility of the firm (p. 7). From a governance perspective, a recent CyLab governance report 
indicates boards are looking for assurances that their IT risk decisions are based on well thought out and 
executed strategic IT plans (PR Newswire 2012). These three governance actors, CEOs, CFOs, and the 
board, and their roles with regard to the security breach aspect of IT risk are discussed next.  
 
CEO IT Expertise 
 
CEOs set the tone for their firms. Their attitudes and decisions affect decision making made throughout 
multiple levels of the firm (Berson et al. 2008). Further, there is evidence that the background of the CEO 
can affect their managerial decisions (Bamber et al. 2010; Baik et al. 2011). Haislip and Richardson (2016) 
find that CEOs with IT expertise improve the information environment for their firms as evidenced by 
more accurate earnings forecasts. Haislip et al. (2016a) find that firms that report IT-related material 
weaknesses in internal controls are more likely to hire a CEO with IT expertise following the revelation of 
the weakness. Finally, Haislip et al. (2016b) find that CEOs with IT expertise disclose key filings more 
timely than other firms. More relevant to our study, firms that employ a CEO who is comfortable with 
technology tend to find that the comfort level with IT permeates throughout the firm (Bassellier et al. 
2003; Finney and Corbett 2007).2 Further, a tone of acceptance of IT set by a CEO with IT expertise 
improves the information environment for the firm.  
 
In aggregate, the findings above agree with the earlier IT risk management discussion and suggest that by 
setting a strong, strategic IT tone at the top, trickling down to an improved information environment at an 
operational level, CEOs with IT expertise should be able to improve monitoring effectiveness throughout 
their firms. Therefore, our first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: The presence of CEOs possessing IT expertise is positively associated with the likelihood of reported 
breaches. 
 
Technology Committees 
 
The rapid ascension of technology committees is summarized in the 2015 Spencer Stuart Board Index for 
S&P 500 firms. The existence of technology committees in S&P 500 firms went from 0 in 2000, to 2% in 
2002, 7% in 2012, and 9% in 2015 (Spencer Stuart 2015). Kickenweiz et al.’s (2016) interview of public 
firm board members provides some additional insights for this ascension. Specifically, boards are ill-
prepared for the pace of IT developments within their firms. Board members cannot use standard 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) procedures to identify data security risks and most are not IT 
experts; therefore, their understanding lags reality with regard to IT trends. Further, Kickenweiz et al. 
(2016) argue that having IT experts in a technology committee is a great advantage, because they can 
educate the rest of the board about cybersecurity risks.  
 
A recent Protiviti (2016) survey on cybersecurity indicates that in addition to management’s policies, the 
strength of a firm’s cybersecurity measures largely falls on board engagement. The study’s opening 
quotation suggests that the Director of the NACD believes forming a technology committee is the correct 
model for firms to be engaged in cybersecurity oversight. To extrapolate further on this suggestion, he 
believes that board oversight, in general, is seriously challenged in its ability to review, monitor, and 
govern data security-related risks (NACD 2015). In their ITG chapter, Sambamurthy and Zmud (2012) 
make analogous lack of IT expertise comments, while also advocating for a separate, board-level 
technology committee to serve as a foundation for oversight of critical IT risk decisions.3  
The presence of a technology committee is an indicator of a strong IT tone at the top. Specifically, firms 
with technology committees are willing to absorb the costs of another board-level committee in order to 
                                                             
2 According to PwC’s Global CEO Survey (2015b), CEOs see cybersecurity-related technologies as a top-three most 
strategically important type of digital methodology for their firm.  
3 Similarly, Hines et al. (2015) relate the increased demand for board-level risk management caused by the financial 
crisis to the formation of risk committees.  
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improve IT risk oversight. The additional oversight serves as a proxy for active engagement in ITG and IT 
risk management activities. According to Haislip et al. (2016b), the presence of a technology committee 
can help monitor and support management’s strategic choices related to the utilization of the firm’s IT, 
resulting in an improved information environment. In sum, anecdotal and academic research suggest that 
firms having dedicated technology committees will provide a strong IT tone at the top such that they are 
more likely than others to detect and report security breaches. Consequently, our next hypothesis is 
stated: 
H2: The presence of a board-level technology committee is positively associated with the likelihood of 
reported breaches. 
 
CFO IT Expertise 
CFOs typically control the most sensitive firm information on a daily basis; however, until recently CFOs 
have not been viewed as a critical member of a firm’s security team (Durbin 2015). That view is changing 
according to the results from a 2015 Gartner/Financial Executives Institute (FEI) survey. CFOs now have 
a major influence over many IT decisions, because the pervasiveness of technology has caused it to be part 
of firms’ business decisions (Gartner 2015). A significant change in the survey results over 2014’s survey is 
the rise of security as the second most critical investment CFO’s make in IT. This change is due in large 
part to some CFOs becoming more tech savvy. A CFO lacking IT expertise representing a weak IT tone at 
the top can be detrimental to this process, because (s)he does not understand the important issues to 
report to the board or appropriate questions to ask. A recent Deloitte (2014) survey finds 74% of CFOs 
view cybersecurity as a high priority, but more than half cite anxieties related to data security and related 
communications to the board due to lack of expertise. 
 
However, CFOs are typically concerned with regulatory compliance (Burchill 2015) due to their fiduciary 
duties. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has recently warned firms that it would be 
looking into their cybersecurity preparedness to ensure the firms have specific policies and procedures in 
place to conduct periodic risk assessments (Abromovitz 2014). The SEC examinations specifically involve 
key ITG metrics including evaluating data security risks and involvement of senior managers and boards 
of directors (ThinkAdvisor 2015). Further, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) has 
recently expressed concern that firms are not acting “reasonably” when it comes to cybersecurity-related 
policies and practices (Leonhardt 2015). Recent events like the Target, JP MorganChase, and Sony 
breaches serve as reminders to CFOs of the significant damage to firm reputation and increased CFO 
turnover if they do not maintain a strong IT security infrastructure (as part of a strong IT tone at the top). 
The CFO serves a major ITG oversight role with the firm. (S)he is a liaison between the IT department and 
the board on cyber-related issues and, therefore, needs to understand where the firm’s information is at 
all times and how it is protected from unauthorized access (Katz 2016).  
 
The arguments made by the anecdotal literature cited above are generally supported in academic research 
by Haislip et al. (2016a), who find that CFOs with IT expertise are more effective than other CFOs at 
improving internal control environments following IT related material weaknesses. However, as Masli et 
al. (2016) point out, CFOs are disproportionately punished by the board (i.e., higher turnover relative to 
CEOs) when IT material weaknesses are reported.4 Whereas, CEOs typically set the long-term, IT firm 
strategies in order to detect situations when other managers/employees circumvent firm policies and 
controls, CFOs are more on the “front line” with regard to preventing security breaches (Bailey et al. 
2014). Therefore, consistent with arguments made in the anecdotal, academic ITG, and IT risk 
management literatures, we predict that CFOs with IT expertise should foster a strong IT tone at the top 
and put into place security-related control policies that prevent breaches. Our third hypothesis is as 
follows: 
H3: The presence of CFOs possessing IT expertise is negatively associated with the likelihood of reported 
breaches. 
                                                             
4 Similar to Masli et al. (2016), in untabulated analysis we find that CFOs are disproportionately punished by the 
board following breaches. Specifically, we find that CFOs are more likely to experience turnover than CEOs in the year 
of a reported breach. 
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Method  
Sample and Variable Composition 
 
Following prior research (Gwebu et al. 2013; Higgs et al. 2016), we identify breaches using 
privacyrights.org. Privacyrights.org identifies 634 reported breaches from 362 firms from 2005 through 
March, 2014. We then match these identified breaches with our S&P 1500 sample, and end with 127 
reported breaches of S&P 1500 firms during the period 2005 through 2013.  After eliminating 
observations with missing data from Compustat, CRSP, and Audit Analytics used to calculate the variables 
in our models, we arrive at a final sample of 9,633 firm-year observations. 
 
We measure CEO and CFO IT expertise following Lim et al. (2013) and Haislip and Richardson (2016). 
We first identify the CEOs and CFOs in our sample firms using the Corporate Library. Then, we read the 
biographies of these executives found using the Corporate Library, Bloomberg, BusinessWeek, or Forbes 
to determine if the executive has IT expertise. An executive is considered to have IT expertise if they have 
an academic degree in Computer Science, Electrical Engineering, or Information Systems; or if they 
previously served in an IT-related position of employment (e.g., Chief Information Officer (CIO), Chief 
Technology Officer, Vice President of Information Technology, or IT consultant). One author and two 
research assistants were independently involved in the coding process. The percentage of agreement (the 
inter-rater reliability) among these four independent coders was over 90% for the IT Expert variable 
respectively. These agreement scores are well above the recommended threshold of 70% (Cohen 1960). 
Our sample identifies 676 (554) firm-year observations where a CEO (CFO) with IT expertise is employed. 
Consistent with Higgs et al. (2016), to examine the board’s role in ITG, we identify board-level technology 
committees (Tech Comm) using Audit Analytics and find committees with the word “technology” in them. 
We then manually verify the existence of these committees by reading the annual proxy statements. Our 
sample identifies 230 firm years in which a technology committee is present. 
 
Research Design 
 
We investigate the likelihood of security breaches for all of our hypotheses. We use the following logistic 
regression to test the hypotheses: 
Breachi,t = α0 + α1[IT Governance]i,t + α2CIOi,t + α3LnATi,t + α4ROAi,t + α5Lossi,t + α6Leveragei,t + 
α7Weaki,t + α8Zscorei,t + α9Big4i,t + α10Foreigni,t + α11Mergeri,t + α12Extrai,t + зi,t.                       (1) 
For this model we include year and industry fixed effects, and we estimate robust standard error clustered 
by firm (Petersen 2009). Breach is an indicator variable coded as one if the firm reports a security breach 
in year t, and zero otherwise. ITG is a representation of our three variables of interest (CEO IT Expert, 
Tech Comm, and CFO IT Expert) as explained in the Sample and Variable Composition section. CEOs 
with IT expertise and technology committees should serve monitoring roles as their ITG role. We predict 
that these governance actors aid in the detection and reporting of security breaches. Therefore, we expect 
a positive and significant coefficient on CEO IT Expert and Tech Comm. CFOs with IT expertise are more 
likely to play a different role in ITG and should aid in the prevention of breaches. Thus, we expect the 
coefficient on CFO IT Expert to be negative and significant.  Following Higgs et al. (2016), we include 
control variables for other possible determinants of breaches. First, we include CIO, because a company 
employing an IT executive may mitigate the likelihood of a security breach. Next, we include measures of 
size (LnAT), as recommended earlier in this study, and performance (ROA, Loss, Leverage, and Zscore), 
because as Higgs et al. suggest larger more successful firms are more attractive targets for potential 
breaches. We also include Weak, Foreign, Merger, and Extra, because firms with weak internal control 
environments or more complicated operational structures may be more susceptible to breaches. Finally, 
we include Big4 as these high quality auditors tend to serve as external monitors for their client firms.   
 
Endogeneity Consideration 
 
We also conduct a Heckman (1979) two stage approach to address potential endogeneity concerns. We 
follow Haislip and Richardson (2016) and use the following probit model shown to predict that likelihood 
to employ our governance actors: 
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[IT Governance]i,t = Ω0 + Ω1LnATi,t + Ω2ROAi,t + Ω3Leveragei,t + Ω4High Techi,t + Ω5CIOi,t + 
Ω6ITMWi,t + Ω7EarnVoli,t + Ω8Foreigni,t + Ω9Mergeri,t + Ω10Restructi,t + Ω11ProdcutDiffi,t + 
Ω12CostLeaderi,t + Ω13Transformi,t + зi,t.                                                            (2) 
Compared to equation (1), there are a few instrumental variables included in this model (High Tech, 
ITMW, EarnVol, Restruct, ProductDiff, and CostLeader) that are not associated with Breach. We then 
use the output from this calculation to calculate the inverse Mills ratio separately for each ITG variable 
and include it in logistic model equation 1. We expect to find the same results using this method as we do 
in the primary logistic regression. 
Results  
Table 1 presents a univariate analysis of our variables, comparing the group of Breach observations to 
non-Breach observations. It appears that for most variables, the two groups are similar. However, the 
Breach group appears to be larger, less likely to report a loss, more leveraged, report a lower Zscore, use 
less of a cost leader strategy, and report more volatile earnings. Some of these results are not surprising. 
As discussed earlier in the study, larger and more successful firms tend to more attractive targets for 
potential breaches. We include all of these variables as control variables in our testing.   
  N = 127   N = 9,506   Difference   P-Value 
IT Expert CEO 0.094 
 
0.07 
 
0.025 
 
0.28 
IT Expert CFO 0.031 
 
0.058 
 
-0.026 
 
0.205 
Tech Comm 0.039 
 
0.024 
 
0.016 
 
0.25 
CIO 0.15 
 
0.122 
 
0.028 
 
0.338 
LnAT 9.509 
 
7.642 
 
1.866 
 
0.000*** 
ROA 0.056 
 
0.049 
 
0.007 
 
0.465 
Loss 0.087 
 
0.149 
 
-0.062 
 
0.051* 
Leverage 0.618 
 
0.498 
 
0.12 
 
0.000*** 
Weak 0.031 
 
0.044 
 
-0.012 
 
0.508 
Zscore 3.858 
 
4.677 
 
-0.819 
 
0.063* 
Big 4 0.961 
 
0.924 
 
0.036 
 
0.122 
Foreign 0.331 
 
0.394 
 
-0.064 
 
0.144 
Merger 0.228 
 
0.23 
 
-0.002 
 
0.961 
Extra 0.031 
 
0.017 
 
0.014 
 
0.228 
Restructure 0.441 
 
0.488 
 
-0.047 
 
0.288 
ITMW 0.008 
 
0.008 
 
0 
 
0.98 
ProductDiff 0.144 
 
0.098 
 
0.046 
 
0.293 
CostLeader 0.957 
 
1.13 
 
-0.173 
 
0.011** 
EarnVol 1089.26 
 
232.1 
 
857.158 
 
0.000*** 
Table 1. Univariate Analysis 
 
Empirical Results 
 
Table 2 presents the results from logistic regression model (1) in which we investigate the effects of IT 
Expert CEO, Tech Comm, and IT Expert CFO on the likelihood of a reported breach. All of the models are 
estimated using robust standard errors clustered by firm, with a sample time frame from 2005-2013. All 
of the columns include year and industry fixed effects. The dependent variable for all of the columns is 
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Breach, which is an indicator variable coded as one if the firm reports a security breach in the current 
year, and zero otherwise.   
 
As predicted, the coefficient on IT Expert CEO is positive and significant (p < 0.10) in both Columns (1) 
and (4), suggesting that firms that employ CEOs with IT expertise are more likely to detect and report 
breaches. This result supports H1 and suggests that CEOs with IT expertise positively influence the 
strategic IT tone at the top and effectively monitor IT security. As predicted in H2, we find that the 
coefficient on Tech Comm is positive and significant (p < 0.01) in Columns (2) and (4). This result 
suggests that firms who have a board-level technology committee are more likely to detect and report 
breaches even if the firm employs CEOs and/or CFOs with IT expertise. According to Turel and Bart 
(2014), high levels of board participation in ITG activities, regardless of existing IT needs, increases firm 
performance. Therefore, we conduct an F-Test to determine if technology committees are more effective 
than CEOs with IT expertise at reporting breaches. As shown at the bottom of Table 4, we find that the 
two coefficients are not statistically significantly different from each other. Next, the coefficient on IT 
Expert CFO is negative and significant (p < 0.10) in both Columns (3) and (4), suggesting that firms that 
employ CFOs with IT expertise are more likely to prevent security breaches. This result supports H3. 
Turning to the control variables, it is not surprising that LnAT is positive and significant, because larger 
firms tend to be targets for breaches. We then consider the potential interplay among our three 
governance actors by interacting Tech Comm with both IT Expert CEO and IT Expert CFO. We find that 
there are no reported breaches for any firms that have a technology committee and either an IT expertise 
CEO (15 observations) or IT expertise CFO (25 observations). The findings from these small samples 
provide some evidence suggesting that firms employing two of our governance actors are successfully 
preventing breaches.   
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
  Pred Breach   Breach   Breach   Breach 
IT Expert CEO + 0.529* 
  
 
  
0.574** 
  
(0.060) 
  
 
  
(0.048) 
Tech Comm + 
  
1.056*** 
   
1.080*** 
    
(0.006) 
 
  
(0.007) 
IT Expert CFO - 
   
 
-0.766* 
 
-0.813* 
     
 
(0.072) 
 
(0.063) 
CIO 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.011 
 
0.016 
 
-0.031 
  
(0.992) 
 
(0.971) 
 
(0.959) 
 
(0.919) 
LnAT 
 
0.743*** 
 
0.749*** 
 
0.745*** 
 
0.752*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
ROA 
 
-0.693 
 
-0.656 
 
-0.707 
 
-0.527 
  
(0.574) 
 
(0.587) 
 
(0.576) 
 
(0.661) 
Loss 
 
-0.123 
 
-0.093 
 
-0.107 
 
-0.079 
  
(0.774) 
 
(0.828) 
 
(0.801) 
 
(0.852) 
Leverage 
 
1.014*** 
 
0.971*** 
 
0.993*** 
 
0.994*** 
  
(0.003) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.003) 
Weak 
 
0.037 
 
0.072 
 
0.064 
 
0.058 
  
(0.941) 
 
(0.885) 
 
(0.898) 
 
(0.908) 
Zscore 
 
0.030 
 
0.037 
 
0.039* 
 
0.030 
  
(0.212) 
 
(0.129) 
 
(0.094) 
 
(0.208) 
Big4 
 
-0.558 
 
-0.569 
 
-0.543 
 
-0.574 
  
(0.259) 
 
(0.251) 
 
(0.276) 
 
(0.256) 
Foreign 
 
-0.211 
 
-0.192 
 
-0.210 
 
-0.241 
  
(0.413) 
 
(0.452) 
 
(0.413) 
 
(0.345) 
Merger 
 
-0.244 
 
-0.279 
 
-0.221 
 
-0.269 
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(0.302) 
 
(0.232) 
 
(0.351) 
 
(0.253) 
Extra 
 
0.232 
 
0.223 
 
0.202 
 
0.198 
  
(0.625) 
 
(0.638) 
 
(0.670) 
 
(0.677) 
Constant 
 
-11.130*** 
 
-11.143*** 
 
-11.149*** 
 
-11.217*** 
    (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Year Indicators 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
Industry Indicators 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
Observations 
 
9,633 
 
9,633 
 
9,633 
 
9,633 
Psuedo R2 
 
0.196 
 
0.198 
 
0.197 
 
0.201 
Model Χ2   288.830***   285.420***   294.470***   291.730*** 
Table 2. The Effect of Executive Expertise and Tech Committees on Security Breaches 
  
Table 3 presents the results of our Heckman Model. The columns in this table mirror those presented in 
Table 2, except these include the inverse Mills ratio (Mills) calculated in equation (2). The inverse mills 
ratio is calculated separately for each of our variables of interest, and therefore, we are unable to combine 
all of the variables into the same model. The results are essentially the same as those presented in Table 4 
as all of our variables of interest are significant (p < 0.10) and in the predicted direction. These results 
suggest that even after controlling for endogeneity, we find that firms that utilize CEOs with IT expertise 
and technology committees are more likely to detect and report security breaches, and that firms 
employing CFOs with IT expertise are effective in preventing security breaches.  
    (1)   (2)   (3) 
  Pred Breach   Breach   Breach 
IT Expert CEO + 0.575* 
  
 
 
  
(0.054) 
  
 
 
Tech Comm + 
  
1.124*** 
  
    
(0.004) 
  IT Expert CFO - 
  
  
-0.730* 
    
  
(0.083) 
CIO 
 
-0.062 
 
0.079 
 
-0.001 
  
(0.839) 
 
(0.826) 
 
(0.998) 
LnAT 
 
0.737*** 
 
0.748*** 
 
0.783*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
ROA 
 
-1.355 
 
-0.609 
 
0.518 
  
(0.176) 
 
(0.635) 
 
(0.756) 
Loss 
 
-0.512 
 
-0.286 
 
-0.245 
  
(0.265) 
 
(0.556) 
 
(0.606) 
Leverage 
 
1.637*** 
 
1.062*** 
 
0.950*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.009) 
Weak 
 
0.045 
 
0.124 
 
0.128 
  
(0.928) 
 
(0.803) 
 
(0.796) 
Zscore 
 
0.044** 
 
0.037 
 
0.039* 
  
(0.029) 
 
(0.143) 
 
(0.109) 
Big4 
 
-0.678 
 
-0.606 
 
-0.575 
  
(0.161) 
 
(0.221) 
 
(0.251) 
Foreign 
 
-0.489** 
 
-0.192 
 
-0.275 
  
(0.038) 
 
(0.455) 
 
(0.291) 
Merger 
 
-0.274 
 
-0.120 
 
-0.159 
  
(0.253) 
 
(0.678) 
 
(0.504) 
Extra 
 
0.140 
 
0.054 
 
-0.064 
  
(0.781) 
 
(0.921) 
 
(0.908) 
Mills 
 
-0.435 
 
0.303 
 
1.181*** 
  
(0.215) 
 
(0.326) 
 
(0.007) 
Constant 
 
-9.718*** 
 
-12.152*** 
 
-13.715*** 
    (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Year Indicators 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
Industry Indicators 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
Observations 
 
9,633 
 
9,633 
 
9,633 
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Psuedo R2 
 
0.153 
 
0.198 
 
0.199 
Model Χ2   169.330***   316.820***   320.070*** 
 Table 3. Heckman Model  
Conclusion 
Security breaches are costly for firms who are feeling pressure from stockholders and regulators to make 
improvements to their ITG structure to prevent and detect said security breaches. Our study takes an IT 
tone at the top/IT risk management perspective to investigate three governance actors to see if they are 
effective in the fight against security breaches. Qualitative analysis suggests that S&P 1500 firms are 
increasingly recognizing the value of IT expertise of CEOs and technology committees, especially, given 
their numbers essentially double over the course of our sample period. 
 
Although our study is subject to the typical data-related limitations, we also cannot rule out the possibility 
that the positive associations found essentially represent firms who are breached more because they 
possess CEOs with IT expertise or technology committees. Our consistent results related to the Heckman 
Model testing help to curb this possibility, but future research should go a step further and investigate our 
research question using a causation model. Our study is also limited to primarily large, public firms, 
because they typically command more attention. Future research should examine our variables of interest 
using all public firms to investigate any potential firm size issues.  
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